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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Clearly, justice would not be served by imposing absolute liability on
the unwary judgment creditor.
CPLR 5240: Court protects "interested" third party from execution
sale.
CPLR 5240 was designed to enable the court, "at any time, on its
own initiation or the motion of any interested'58 person," to "make
an order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating, extending or
modifying the use of any enforcement procedure." This section em-
powers the court "to prevent unreasonable annoyance and abuse in the
use of the provisions of article 52 of the CPLR in enforcing judg-
ments."'159 But it does not authorize the court to ignore the procedures
of article 52. It only permits "a certain amount of tinkering on the
structure by the judicial handyman .... not.., the construction of an
entirely new wing using jurisprudential architecture."' 60
In a recent case, Gilchrist v. Commercial Credit Corp.,161 petitioner
sought an order, grounded upon CPLR 5240, to prevent the sale of
her estranged husband's interest in a residence owned by them as
tenants by the entirety and presently occupied by petitioner and her
four infant children. The judgment, for $502.74, had been entered
against the husband almost six years ago and the execution, upon which
the proposed sale was predicated, had been obtained in February, 1971.
The court concluded "that to subject petitioner to the consequences
that would flow from the transfer of her husband's interest to a third
party and, perhaps more importantly, to subject her children to the
risk that their home would be lost entirely if their mother did not sur-
vive their father is not warranted."'' 62 It therefore granted the petition.
158" 'Interested' as used in CPLR 5240 would encompass any person, whether or not a
party, who is in danger of suffering pecuniary loss or of being subjected to harassment
through the use of an enforcement procedure." 6 WK&:M 5240.02. Cf. O'Brien v. Fago, 54
Misc. 2d 203, 205, 282 N.Y.S.2d 295, 297 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1967), where Aetna Insurance
Company, as an interested party, brought a proceeding pursuant to CPLR 5240. The court
held "that a surety who has made payments under a labor and material payment bond has
superior rights to those of a judgment creditor to the funds in the hands of an owner
earmarked for payment under a contract for work to be performed ...." (Citations omit-
ted.)
159 Cook v. H.R.H. Constr. Corp., 32 App. Div. 2d 806, 807, 302 N.Y.S.2d 364, 366
(2d Dep't 1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 532, 574 (1970).
160 Kaplan v. Supak & Sons Mfg. Co., 46 Misc. 2d 574, 578, 260 N.Y.S.2d 374, 378
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
161 66 Misc. 2d 791, 322 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971).
162 Id. at 793, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 202. This is especially true since petitioner has invested
much more in the property than the amount represented by respondent's judgment. The
court's action was predicated on the motion of an interested party. See note 1 supra.
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An order was entered to cancel the sale and, to prohibit the execution
of the judgment except byleave of the court.
The court order in Gilchrist is the furthest extension of the au-
thority conferred by CPLR 5240 to fashion the enforcement remedies
according to the circumstances in each case.16 The judgment has not
been abolished; rather, in the name of justice its execution has been
frozen.164 Nevertheless, it should be noted that this decision approaches
the point of divestiture of the creditor's substantive rights.
ARTICLE 71-REcovERY OF CHATTEL
CPLR 7102: Contractual waiver of the right to notice and a hearing
deemed ineffective for the ex parte seizure of certain types of property.
The "blessing of age"'1 5 has failed to obstruct recent salutary
changes in the procedural requirement of the ancient writ of replevin.
The tension between pretrial seizures of personal property and
the constitutional requirements of due process had previously caused
the courts little difficulty. Traditionally, the rationale for the constitu-
tionality of pretrial seizures was as follows: although a person can not
be deprived of his property absent a judicial hearing, the legislature
may determine at what stage of the proceedings a hearing is required,
provided that the person is not unreasonably inconvenienced. 66
Prior to its recent amendment,167 article 71 of New York's CPLR 68
163 See 7B McKINNY's CPLR 5236, supp. commentary at 145 (1969): "[CPLR 5240] is
designed to protect judgment debtors from abuses accruing from the apparently lawful
application of article 52 devices." (Emphasis in original.) However, the Court of Appeals
has not yet passed on the scope of CPLR 5240.
164 fTjhe court can, with no more than an application of CPLR 5240, postpone the
sale for any specified time or, upon any reasonable conditions, cancel it out entirely
and give the judgment debtor a brand new chance to pay.
Nevertheless, CPLR 5240 has not been generally used.
It just seems to be a matter either of the lawyers not pressing for that section's
application, or the judges not taking it as the broad source of authority it was
intended to be.
Id.
165 Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., MS5 F. Supp. 716, 723 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
168 See Flournoy v. City of Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. 169, 174 (1861).
167 L. 1971, ch. 1051, at 1806-10, eff. July 2, 1971.
168 The former CPLR 7101-7112 read, in part, as follows:
7102(a) Seizure of chattel. The sheriff shall seize a chattel without delay when
the plaintiff delivers to him an affidavit, requisition and undertaking and, if an
action to recover the chattel has not been commenced, a summons and complaint.
7102(c) Affidavit. The affidavit shall dearly identify the chattel to be seized
and shall state: 1. that the plaintiff is entitled to possession by virtue of facts set
forth; 2. that the chattel is wrongfully held by the defendant named; 3. whether
an action to recover the chattel has been commenced, the defendants served...
7102(d) Requisition. The requisition shall be deemed the mandate of the
court and shall direct the sheriff of any county where the chattel is found to
seize the chattel described in the affidavit.
